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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). This appeal is taken from the 
March 21, 1989, final judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, 
denying defendant John P. Pizzello?s Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment? 
2. Was defendant denied due process, both under the 
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution? 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that it had 
obtained jurisdiction upon the defendant John P. Pizzello through 
valid service of process. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
United States Constitution, Amendment Fourteen, §1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the 
state wherein they reside. No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
~1» 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person for 
an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have a remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in the state, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: See Addendum A. 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: See Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A- Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and 
Disposition of the Court Below. 
The controversy in the instant appeal arises out of an 
automobile accident which occurred on April 16, 1986. The automo-
bile accident involved a vehicle driven and owned by defendant 
Dale W. Gertz and a vehicle driven by plaintiff Pamela E. 
Gillespie, which vehicle was owned by plaintiff Jerry Gillespie. 
(R. 2-3). 
The Gillespies filed a complaint against the defendant 
Gertz on or about June 30, 1987. (R. 2). Thereafter, on or about 
January 7, 1988, plaintiffs amended their complaint to include 
defendant Sprinklers, Sod and Such and John P. Pizzello. (R. 22). 
On October 11, 1988, a default judgment was entered 
against defendant John P. Pizzello based upon the affidavit of the 
process server indicating that service had been obtained against 
the defendant Pizzello. (R. 38-39). 
On January 9, 1989, within three months of the default 
judgment, defendant Pizzello, through counsel, filed a motion to 
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set aside judgment along with a memorandum in support of motion to 
set aside default. (R. 47-48). 
Plaintiffs' counsel filed its memorandum in opposition on 
or about January 23, 1989, and defendant Pizzello filed his reply 
memorandum on or about January 26. Also filed with the reply 
memorandum was a request to submit the motion for a decision. 
(R. 49-58). 
On January 31, 1989, plaintiffs filed a request for oral 
argument and hearing. However, on January 17, 1989, without oral 
argument, the Honorable Scott Daniels caused to be filed a minute 
entry denying defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. 
(R. 66-67; 73) . 
B* Statement of Facts. 
1. The vehicle that was driven by Mr. Gertz which was 
involved in the April 16, 1986 automobile accident was owned by 
defendant Gertz but was insured under an automobile insurance pol-
icy issued to defendant John P. Pizzello by Guaranty National 
Insurance Company. (R. 43). The vehicle involved in the accident 
was a 1984 Chevrolet S-10, Utah License No. AH4-557. (R. 2). 
2. On April 16, 1986, plaintiff Pamela Gillespie was 
stopped behind cars proceeding south on State Street, at the 
intersection of 3900 South in Salt Lake City. At that time, 
plaintiff was allegedly rear-ended by defendant Gertz while he 
was operating the 1984 Chevrolet S-10. (R. 3). 
3. Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that 
defendant Pizzello was involved in a partnership with defendant 
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Gertz known as Sprinklers, Sod and Such. Plaintiffs further 
alleged that the defendant Gertz was acting in the course of busi-
ness conducted by Sprinklers, Sod and Such at the time of the sub-
ject accident. (R. 22-24). 
4. The original complaint filed by the plaintiffs named 
only Dale Gertz as defendant. (R. 2). Following the filing of 
the original complaint, plaintiffs filed a subpoena ducus tecum 
upon Guaranty National Insurance Company on August 31, 1987 
requesting documentation of all insurance policies issued to John 
P. Pizzello. (R. 10). 
5. After receiving information regarding the insurance 
of John P. Pizzello, the Gillespies caused to be filed the amended 
complaint, naming as defendants Dale W. Gertz, John P. Pizzello, 
and Sprinklers, Sod and Such. (R. 27). 
6. The Gillespies attempted to obtain personal service 
upon defendant Pizzello and retained David T. Holland to perfect 
service upon Mr. Pizzello. Mr. Holland attested that he was able 
to obtain personal service upon Mr. Pizzello with the summons and 
amended complaint on April 21, 1988. (R. 36-37). 
7. On the back of the return of service, Mr. Holland 
wrote that he observed Mr. Pizzello go into what he believed to be 
Mr. Pizzello's apartment. (R. 37). Mr. Holland thereafter went 
to the apartment door, rang the doorbell and yelled that he had a 
court summons and amended complaint for Mr. Pizzello. (R. 69). 
Mr. Holland attested there was no answer and that no one opened 
the door. (R. 69). Mr. Holland further attested he continued to 
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pound on the door and ring the doorbell for approximately 10 min-
utes with no response. (R. 70). Mr. Holland then announced that 
as an officer of the Salt Lake Court, he was leaving the court 
summons and amended complaint at the front door of the apartment 
and that by doing so concluded that service had been obtained. 
(R. 70). Mr. Holland then attested that approximately five min-
utes later, he saw whom he believed to be Mr. Pizzello drive away 
from the apartment complex. (R. 71). Mr. Holland allegedly then 
went back to the apartment and saw that the summons and amended 
complaint which had been left by the door was gone. (R. 71). 
8. No answer to the complaint was filed by Mr. Pizzello 
and on or about October 11, 1988, the Honorable Scott Daniels 
entered a default judgment against Mr. Pizzello. (R. 39). 
9. On January 19, 1989, the defendant John P. Pizzello, 
within three months of the date of the default judgment, through 
counsel retained by defendant Pizzellofs insurer, moved the court 
for a motion to set aside default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 47-48). Following 
exchange of memoranda by the parties, Judge Daniels on January 17, 
1989, caused a minute entry to be filed indicating that the 
defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment was denied. 
Judge Daniels decided the matter without oral argument despite a 
request for oral argument from counsel for the Gillespies. (R. 
66-67; 73). On March 21, 1989, an order was signed reflecting the 
court's denial of defendant Pizzello's motion to set aside default 
judgment. (R. 74-75). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
set aside the default judgment. Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court is vested with dis-
cretion in setting aside the default judgment. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has held that where a reasonable excuse is offered by a 
defaulting party, the courts should generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment particularly where the 
adequacy of service of process has not clearly been determined, 
2. The standard established by the Utah Supreme Court 
in determining whether a motion to set aside default judgment 
should be granted violates the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution. Particularly 
to the extent that the defendant is required to offer proof of a 
meritorious defense when seeking to set aside a default judgment. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a procedural rule 
which requires a showing a meritorious defense is unconstitutional 
when the requirements imposed is in addition to procedural 
requirements which would otherwise justify setting aside a default 
judgment. 
3. The requirements of showing a meritorious defense in 
addition to the procedural requirements of Rule 60(b) also violate 
the Utah Constitution's guarantee of due process. Additionally, 
the defendant was deprived of open access to the courts as also 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. 
4. The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defen-
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dant Pizzello as a result of the invalid service attempted against 
defendant Pizzello. Defendant was not served personally nor was 
there a refusal by the defendant to accept a copy of the process. 
As such, the court lacked the jurisdiction to enter the default 
against the defendant in the first instance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT, 
Defendant recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the trial court has considerable discretion in considering a 
motion to set aside a judgment. Defendant also acknowledges that 
the appellate court will not overturn a denial of a defendant's 
motion to set aside default unless there is an abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court. 
In citing the above-mentioned rule, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 
1982), stated: 
The trial court has considerable discretion 
ruling on a motion to set aside a default 
judgment under Rule 60(b) and this Court 
will reverse the trial court only where a 
clear abuse of discretion is shown. Mayhew 
v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 
376 P.2d 951 (1962); Central Finance Co. v. 
Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d 284, 452 P.2d 316 
(196 9) ; Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. 
Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973). 
Id. at 430. 
In Swapp, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion 
by the trial court in refusing to set aside a default judgment 
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where the trial court entered a default judgment based upon the 
defendant's repeated failure to comply with discovery. The lower 
court had held that Swapp's motion to set aside the judgment was 
based upon negligence and was therefore not filed within the 
three-month time limit of Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 
The Utah Supreme Court on occasion has ruled that the 
trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside a 
default judgment. The Supreme Court has not particularly outlined 
what would constitute abuse of discretion. However, the court has 
issued general guidelines on the subject. 
In Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d 
369 (Utah 1980), the court offered the following: 
It is not to be questioned that in appropri-
ate circumstances default judgments are 
justified; and when they are, they are 
invulnerable to attack. However, they are 
not favored in the law, especially where a 
party has timely responded with challenging 
pleadings. When that has been done some 
caution should be observed to see that the 
party is not taken advantage of. Speaking 
generally about such problems, it is to be 
kept in mind that access to the courts for 
the protection of rights and the settlement 
of disputes is the one of the most important 
factors in the maintenance of a peaceful and 
well ordered society 
* * * 
The uniformally acknowledged policy of 
the law is to accord litigants the 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits, 
where that can be done without serious 
injustice to the other party. To that end, 
the courts are generally indulgent toward 
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the setting aside of default judgments where 
there is a reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to 
appear, and where timely application is made 
to set it aside. Consistent with the objec-
tive just stated, where there is doubt about 
whether a default should be set aside, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of doing 
so, to the end that each party may have an 
opportunity to present his side of the 
controversy and that there be a resolution 
in accordance with the law and justice. 
Id. at 371. 
In Interstate Excavating, defendant sought reversal of 
the denial of its motion based upon Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to set aside a default judgment. The plaintiff 
filed its complaint in May of 1978. The defendant timely answered 
the complaint and asserted an answer and defenses as well as a 
counterclaim. A pretrial conference was held on April 16, 1979, 
at which time defendant's counsel made a motion to withdraw, which 
motion was granted. The court instructed plaintiff's attorney to 
notify the defendant to obtain new counsel. The court also set 
the case for trial for May 7, 1979 despite the defendant's 
counsel's withdrawal. Plaintiff's attorneys certified that on 
April 16, notice of the trial setting was mailed to the 
defendant's business address. Defendant's attorney also certified 
that he mailed to the defendant a notice of the trial setting and 
notice of his withdrawal as counsel. However, the defendant 
denied ever receiving notice from his former attorney or the 
plaintiff's attorney regarding the trial setting. The trial date 
was set for May 7 and no one appeared on behalf of the defendant. 
Judgment was entered by the plaintiff and defendant's counterclaim 
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was dismissed. 
The defendant argued before the lower court that its 
former counsel withdrew from a number of cases simultaneously and 
that the notice to appoint counsel may have been misplaced with 
other papers served upon the defendant's office by mail. 
Defendant further argued in support of its motion to set aside the 
default that it had no notice of the trial until it received the 
notice of a judgment dated May 14. Upon receipt of the notice of 
judgment, the defendant immediately contacted present counsel, who 
then filed the motion to set aside the default. In overturning 
the lower court's denial to set aside the default judgment, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Application of the principles discussed 
herein to the instant situation leads us to 
the conclusion that the interests of justice 
will best be served by setting aside the 
default judgment and giving the parties that 
opportunity. In that connection, we call 
attention to the prefatory clause of Rule 
60(b) that "upon such terms as are just" a 
party may be relieved from judgment. This 
authorizes the trial court to impose such 
terms as may be just as a condition to 
setting aside the default. 
Id. at 371. 
Under the facts of the instant case, this court is 
justified in concluding that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to grant defendant's motion to set aside the 
default. There is a genuine issue as to whether or not the serv-
ice of process upon Mr. Pizzello was adequate. The alleged serv-
ice upon Mr. Pizzello did not comply with Rule 4(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and there is no evidence offered by the 
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plaintiff that the defendant was refusing service. Without per-
sonal service in this matter, as will be discussed in greater 
detail below, the trial court may have lacked jurisdiction to 
enter a default judgment. At the least, the court abused its dis-
cretion when service upon the defendant was questionable. 
Additionally, defendant should have been relieved of 
judgment based upon excusable neglect. The plaintiffs' only 
allegation against Mr. Pizzello is that he was in partnership with 
Mr. Gertz in a business known as Sprinklers, Sod and Such. The 
plaintiffs allege that Mr. Gertz was acting in the scope of his 
business at the time of the automobile accident. However, in 
answer to the plaintiffs1 amended complaint, Mr. Gertz 
specifically denied that he was acting in the course and scope of 
his business when he was involved in the accident with Pamela 
Gillespie. There is no evidence to substantiate the plaintiffs' 
claims that Mr. Pizzello had any liability to the plaintiffs for 
the damages caused. Therefore, assuming the amended complaint and 
summons was served upon Mr. Pizzello, he was at worst liable for 
excusable neglect for failing to act on the matter. 
The trial court erred in failing to liberally grant 
relief from judgment and in so doing denied the defendant his 
opportunity to be heard on the merits of the matter. If the 
defendant in Interstate Excavating was granted relief from judg-
ment so that the interests of justice would be served by giving 
the parties an opportunity to litigate the merits of the case, it 
would appear that this defendant should also be granted the same 
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relief by this court. 
POINT II. 
THE "MUSSELMAN STANDARD" ESTABLISHED BY THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State By and 
Through Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1983), outlined three requirements that must be met by a defendant 
in order to be relieved from default judgment. Those requirements 
include a showing that the judgment was entered against the defen-
dant through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in 
Rule 60(b)); a showing that the defendant's motion to set aside 
the judgment was timely; and a showing of a meritorious defense to 
the action. 
In the underlying action of the instant case, the 
defendant cited the Musselman case in its memorandum in support of 
motion to set aside judgment and argued to the court that the 
requirements outlined in Musselman had been met by the defendant 
Pizzello and as such, the defendant should be entitled to relief 
from default judgment. 
The lower court on refusing to set aside the default 
judgment must have determined that the defendant had failed to 
meet one or more of the three-part test developed by the Supreme 
Court in Musselman. The defendant's motion, however, was timely 
as it was filed within three months of the date of judgment. 
Additionally, the defendant argued that he was entitled to have 
the default set aside on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, 
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surprise or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, the defendant argued that 
relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4) which provides that a 
party may be relieved from final judgment when the summons in the 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As 
two of the three requirements of Musselman were clearly met, it 
would appear that the trial court's only basis for refusing to set 
aside the default judgment was based upon the failure to show a 
meritorious defense to the action. 
The defendant did attempt to outline in the memorandum in 
support of motion to set aside the default and in the reply 
memorandum in support of motion to set aside the default his 
meritorious defense to the action. Whether that attempt was 
insufficient in showing a meritorious defense should not have been 
the determining factor to the denial of his motion. The need to 
show meritorious defense violated the defendant's constitutional 
right of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Particularly to the extent that the defendant was required to 
offer proof of a meritorious defense when he sought to set aside 
the default judgment. 
In Gary Fassio v. The Honorable Maurice Jones and 
Collection Management Agency, Inc., No. 88-C-965G (D. Utah 1989) 
(Memorandum Decision and Order) (see Addendum C), Judge Greene of 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, con-
cluded that the promulgated procedural rule of court developed in 
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Musselman which imposed the showing of a meritorious defense before 
a default judgment could be vacated was unconstitutional as a vio-
lation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 
In Fassio, the plaintiff Gary Fassio wrote and issued a 
check in the amount of $8.71 to Hires, a Salt Lake City restaurant. 
The check was thereafter dishonored for insufficient funds and was 
returned to Hires unpaid. On April 15, 1988, after receiving 
notice that the check was not paid, plaintiff mailed a money order 
in the amount of $10.00 to Hires to cover the check and to help 
defray additional costs. On October 29, 1988, defendant Collec-
tion Management Agency, Inc., at the direction of Hires filed a 
civil action against Fassio for the collection of the dishonored 
check. Fassio was properly served with a summons and complaint 
but believed that the matter was resolved when he sent the money 
order to Hires. Fassio therefore did not file an answer. On 
June 2, 1988, a default was taken in the Third Circuit Court and 
on June 9, 1988, default judgment was entered against Mr. Fassio 
in the amount of $190.46. 
Mr. Fassio then filed a motion to set aside the default 
judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 55(c) and 
60(b) on August 23, 1988 in the Third Circuit Court. On September 
22, a hearing was held on Fassio's motion to set aside the default 
judgment. The Circuit Court Judge, the Honorable Maurice Jones, 
in accordance with the Musselman decision of the Supreme Court of 
Utah, denied Fassiofs motion on the basis that he failed to offer 
a proof of meritorious defense. 
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Fassio then filed in Federal Court under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 
alleging deprivation of property without due process of law as 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
In holding that the rule of court outlined in Musselman 
by the Supreme Court of Utah violated the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Utah District Court relied upon the 
United States Supreme Court decision of Peralta v. Heights Medical 
Center, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988). 
In Peralta, the Heights Medical Center sued a guarantor 
of one of the medical center's debtors to recover on its debt. 
Peralta, the guarantor, did not answer or appear in the suit and a 
default judgment was entered against him. The judgment was 
recorded and enforced through a writ of attachment. Unbeknowst to 
Peralta, his property was sold and the proceeds were used to sat-
isfy the judgment. Thereafter, Peralta filed a bill of review in 
a Texas state trial court, seeking to set aside the default 
judgment. Heights Medical Center moved for summary judgment, 
asserting that the bill of review could be granted and the default 
judgment set aside, only where the petitioner showed a meritorious 
defense to the action in which judgment had been entered. Peralta 
conceded that he did not have a meritorious defense. The trial 
court granted the summary judgment motion, and denied rehearing, 
then Peralta for the first time asserted that entry of the default 
judgment violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 
On appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals, Peralta repeated 
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his claim that requiring a meritorious defense violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but the court affirmed and held that whether 
or not there was a proper service and notice, the showing of 
meritorious defense was required in order to set aside a default 
judgment. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and held: 
The Texas court held that the default judg-
ment must stand absent a showing of a 
meritorious defense to the action which 
judgment was entered without proper notice 
to the appellant, a judgment that had sub-
stantial adverse consequences to the 
appellant. By reason of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that 
holding is plainly infirm. 
Where a person has been deprived the 
property in a manner contrary to the most 
basic tenants of due process, "it is no 
answer to say that in this particular case 
due process of the law would have lead to 
the same result because he had no adequate 
defense upon the merits." 
Peralta, 99 L.Ed.2d at 82 (quoting Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 
237 U.S. 413, 424, 59 L.Ed. 1027, 35 S.Ct. 625 (1950)). 
In Fassio, the defendants attempted to distinguish 
Peralta, based upon the deficiencies which existed with respect to 
the service of process and notice. Defendants argue that the 
procedural defects constituted the underlying due process 
violation. 
However, Judge Greene asserted that had the Supreme Court 
considered the Peralta case strictly from a procedural standpoint, 
that it could have ruled on the matter on the basis of Mullen v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Judge 
Greene noted that Mullen was the landmark case which established 
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the fundamental due process requirement that reasonable notice 
must be given. Judge Greene concluded: 
It appears that the Supreme Court went 
beyond Mullen when it decided Peralta by 
effectively holding that a procedural rule 
which requires the showing of a meritorious 
defense is unconstitutional when that 
requirement is imposed in addition to 
procedural requirements which otherwise 
would justify setting aside a default 
judgment. This court interprets Peralta to 
stand for the proposition that it is a 
denial of due process of law to foreclose a 
consideration of setting aside a default 
judgment because of required showing of a 
meritorious defense. When a default judg-
ment otherwise should be set aside because 
of improper notice or for any of the grounds 
set forth in Rules 55(c) and 60(b), such as 
mistake or inadvertence, to impose the addi-
tional requirements of showing the existence 
of a meritorious defense is to deny a defen-
dant due process. 
Gary Fassio v. The Honorable Maurice Jones and Collection 
Management Agency, Civil No. 88-C-965G, United States District 
Court, District of Utah, Memorandum Decision Order, p. 16 (1989). 
The defendant in the instant action was denied due 
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when he 
was required to establish a meritorious defense in order to be 
relieved from judgment. Based upon that violation, the defendant 
should be entitled to have the default judgment set aside. 
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POINT III. 
THE REQUIREMENT OF A NEED TO SHOW A 
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE IN ORDER TO BE RELIEVED 
OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS A VIOLATION OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS 
AS WELL AS A VIOLATION OF THE OPEN ACCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
As early as 1945, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
that an essential requirement of due process is that every citizen 
be afforded his day in court. In a habeas corpus action in 
Christensen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
The phrase "due process of law" apparently 
originated in our judicial parlance with Lord 
Coke who in construing the language of Magna 
Carta "that no man shall be taken or imprisoned--
or deprived of life, liberty or property but by 
the judgment of his peers or the law of the land" 
said that the phrase, "law of the land" meant 
"due process of law", which definition is the 
language used in our Constitution. Many attempts 
have been made to further define "due process" 
but they all resolve into the thought that a 
party shall have his day in court—that is each 
party shall have the right to a hearing before 
a competent court, with the privilege of being 
heard and introducing evidence to establish his 
cause or defense, after which comes judgment 
upon the record thus made. 
Id. at 316. 
More recently, in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control, 650 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he essential requirement of due process is 
that every citizen be afforded his "day in 
court." "It has always been the policy of our 
law to resolve doubts in favor permitting parties 
to have their day in court on the merits of a 
controversy." 
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Id. at 1296 (quoting Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 
1976). 
The fact that a federal district court residing in the 
state of Utah has determined that the promulgated procedural rule 
of court developed by the Utah Supreme Court in Musselman is 
unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution is significant 
when interpreting the Utah state constitutional due process 
guarantees. In Untermyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 192 P.2d 881 (Utah 
1942), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The due process clause of the state constitution 
is substantially the same as the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the due processes clauses of the 
Federal Constitution are "highly persuasive" as 
to the application of that clause of our state 
constitution. 
Id. at 885. 
In support of the proposition enunciated by the Supreme 
Court that the due process favors permitting parties to have their 
day in court on the merits of a controversy, the Constitution of 
Utah in addition to the general due process requirements contained 
in Article I, §7 provide a specific guarantee of access to the 
courts in Article I, §11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him and his person, 
property or reputation, shall have a remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be admin-
istered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this state, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
By allowing the defendant to be deprived of its day in 
-19-
court under the circumstances where service of process is suspect 
and the defendant had procedurally complied with the rule for 
setting aside a default, offends against both the Article I, §7 
guarantee of due process and the Article I, §11 guarantee of 
access to the courts. Such offenses should entitle the defendant 
to have the judgment set aside. 
POINT IV, 
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
A DEFAULT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT INASMUCH AS 
SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS INVALID-
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the general rule that 
a judgment is void and subject to attack if there is a lack of 
jurisdiction in the court upon the defendant. See Bowen v. Olsen, 
246 P.2d 602 (Utah 1952). 
At the lower court in the instant action, the plaintiffs 
argued that the service upon the defendant Pizzello was proper 
under Rule 4(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
provides: 
If the person to be served refuses to accept 
a copy of the process, service shall be suf-
ficient if the person serving the same shall 
state the name of the process and offer to 
delivery a copy thereof. 
The plaintiffs relied upon the Utah Appellate Court deci-
sion of Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1987), where the 
Appellate Court stated: 
We strongly believe that personal service 
should not become a "degrading game of wiles 
and tricks" nor should a defendant be able to 
defeat service simply by refusing to accept 
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the papers or instructing others, suitable 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, also to 
reject service. 
Id. at 1055. However, the facts of the instant case are substan-
tially different than that in Wood v. Weenig. There is nothing 
in the record to suggest that the defendant Pizzello refused to be 
served. 
It is conceded that the plaintiffs failed to obtain per-
sonal service upon the defendant and obtained the default judgment 
through the alternative service provided under Rule 4(i) which 
provides for service when a person refuses to accept service. 
Mr. Holland, the process server retained by plaintiffs' attorney 
attested in his affidavit that he saw an individual enter an apart-
ment designated by the plaintiffs' attorney as that belonging to 
defendant Pizzello. However, at no time was this individual iden-
tified as defendant Pizzello. 
Mr. Holland also attested that he saw the individual 
enter the designated apartment and then approached the apartment 
to attempt to serve the summons and amended complaint. Mr. Holland 
did so by yelling through the door and pounding on it for approxi-
mately 10 minutes. At no time, however, was there ever a response 
from any individual within said apartment. Following his futile 
efforts to place the summons and amended complaint in the hands of 
the individual within the apartment, Mr. Holland announced in a 
loud voice that he was an officer of the court and that service of 
the summons and amended complaint had been accomplished and that 
he was leaving a copy of the summons and amended complaint outside 
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the apartment door. 
In contrast, in the Woods case relied upon by the plain-
tiffs, the deputy constable spoke for approximately 10 minutes, 
via an intercom, with an individual who identified herself as the 
daughter of the individual to be served and admitted that she was 
over the age of 14. The daughter refused to open the door to 
accept service and stated that she had been instructed by her 
father not to accept any legal papers. After having the conversa-
tion with the daughter for approximately 10 minutes and having 
heard the daughter indicate that she was not to accept legal 
papers, the deputy constable then announced that he was leaving 
the papers on the porch. The court in Woods was justified under 
those facts in concluding that the person to be served was refus-
ing to accept a copy of the process. 
However, under the facts of the instant case, there was 
no confirmation that the individual entering the designated apart-
ment was in fact Mr. Pizzello, neither was there any discussion 
with Mr. Pizzello, either face to face or through the door of 
Mr. Pizzello's residence. In comparison with the Woods decision, 
it appears that the process server in the lower court was not jus-
tified in concluding that Mr. Pizzello was refusing to accept 
service and that service was thus accomplished under Rule 4(i) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Additionally, the summons and amended complaint was sim-
ply left on the doorstep of the designated apartment by Mr. 
Holland. In Business and Professional Adjustments Co. v. Baker, 
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659 P.2d 1025 (Or.App. 1983), a case relied upon by the Utah 
Appellate Court in Woods v. Weenig, the court held that service of 
process was sufficient where papers were placed in a location 
where the defendant was likely to encounter them and where they 
were unlikely to be blown away or destroyed. In the instant case, 
the papers were certainly not placed in a location where they were 
unlikely to be blown away. 
From the preceding, the trial court in the instant action 
was not justified in concluding that service had been obtained 
against defendant Pizzello and erred in entering the default judg-
ment based upon Rule 4(i). Inasmuch as service was invalid, the 
default judgment should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant has presented several legitimate reasons 
for this court to set aside the default judgment entered against 
defendant Pizzello. The lower court abused its discretion in 
failing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
based upon the totality of the factual circumstances and the 
unlikelihood of Mr. Pizzellofs responsibility for the damages 
incurred by the plaintiffs. Assuming that the defendant Pizzello 
was properly served, which assumption is vigorously contested by 
this defendant, defendant Pizzello at worse committed excusable 
neglect in not filing an answer in an amended complaint which 
alleged his only relation to the action as that of being a partner 
to an individual involved in an automobile accident. 
Additionally, under Rule 60(b)(4), the lower court abused 
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its discretion in failing to set aside the default judgment where 
personal service was not obtained against the defendant. 
The defendant's due process rights guaranteed by both the 
Federal Constitution and the Utah Constitution were violated by 
the procedural rules promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Musselman decision requiring a meritorious defense be established 
prior to setting aside a default judgment. 
Additionally, defendant asserts that the default judgment 
is void for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court against the 
defendant Pizzello. The trial court incorrectly assumed and con-
cluded that defendant Pizzello was refusing to accept service and 
thus service was not obtained pursuant to Rule 4(i) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant Pizzello respectfully 
requests that this court reverse the lower court's denial of the 
motion to set aside default judgment. 
DATED this ?A J day of ZXe^^^xX/-^- , 1989. 
STRONG Se HANNI 
BV Uk+fy r. JosepM J[. Jqfyce 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Rule 4 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to have issued when 
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service. Separate 
summonses may be issued and served. 
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is commenced by the filing 
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon within three months from the 
date of such filing. The summons must be served within one year after the 
filing of the complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed, provided that in 
any action brought against two or more defendants in which personal service 
has been obtained upon one of them within the year, the other or others may 
be served or appear at any time before trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the 
court, the names or designations of the pa'rties to the action, the county in 
which it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state the time within which 
the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify 
him that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered 
against him. If the summons be served without a copy of the complaint, or by 
publication, it shall briefly state the sum of money or other relief demanded, 
and in case of publication of summons such summons as published shall con-
tain a description of the subject matter or res involved in the action. Where 
the summons is served without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy of 
said complaint will be served upon or mailed to defendant within ten days 
after such service or that if the address of defendant is unknown, the com-
plaint will be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after such 
service. 
(d) By whom served. The summons, and a copy of the complaint, if any, 
may be served: 
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the county where the service is 
made, or by his deputy, or by any other person over the age of 21 years, 
and not a party to the action; provided, that this rule shall not abrogate 
the provisions of chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1945. 
(2) In another state or United States territory by the sheriff of the 
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by a United States 
marshal or his deputy. 
(3) In a foreign country, either: 
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country; or 
(B) upon an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a 
corporation or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a 
managing or general agent; or 
(C) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed 
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or 
(D) as directed by order of the court. 
Service under (B) or (D) above may be made by any person who is not a 
party and is not less than 21 years of age or who is designated by order of 
the court. 
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service within the state shall be as 
follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering a 
copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual place 
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of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing; or 
by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. 
(2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering a 
copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian; or, 
if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care 
and control of such minor, or with whom he resides, or in whose service he 
is employed. 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or 
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy thereof to his 
legal guardian. 
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a man-
aging or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive serv&e of process and, if the agent is one authorized 
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a 
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found in the 
county in which the action is brought, then upon any such officer or 
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent 
having the management, direction or control of any property of such 
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the 
state. If no such officer or agent can be found in the state, and the defen-
dant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of 
business in this state, or does business in this state, then upon the person 
doing such business or in charge of such office or place of business. 
(5) Upon an incorporated city, by delivering a copy thereof to the 
mayor or recorder; upon an incorporated town, by delivering a copy 
thereof to the president or clerk of the board of trustees. 
(6) Upon a county, by delivering a copy thereof to a county commis-
sioner or to the county clerk of such county. 
(7) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy 
thereof to the president or clerk of the board. 
(8) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the 
president or secretary of its board. 
(9) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be 
brought against the state, by delivering a copy thereof to the attorney 
general. 
(10) Upon a natural person, nonresident of the state of Utah, doing 
business in this state at one or more places of business, as set forth in 
Rule 17(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to 
one of his managers, superintendents or agents. 
(11) Upon a department or agency of this state, or upon any public 
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to 
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secre-
tary. 
(12) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility oper-
ated by the State or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy 
to the person who has the care, custody or control of the individual to be 
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of 
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the individual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any 
case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served. 
(0 Other service. 
(1) Service by publication. Where the person upon whom service is 
sought resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or 
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself 
to avoid the service of process, or where such party is a corporation hav-
ing no officer or other agent upon whom process can be served within this 
state, or where in an action in rem some or all of the defendants are 
unknown, service of process may be made by publication, as follows: 
The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion 
verified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order 
of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service and shall 
show the efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within 
this state, and shall give the address, or last known address, of each 
person to be served or shall state that the same is unknown. The court 
shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been 
used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to obtain 
the same would have been of no avail, shall order publication of the 
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in 
which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made at least once 
a week for four successive weeks. Within ten days after the order is 
entered, the clerk shall mail a copy of the summons and complaint to each 
person whose address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be 
complete on the day of the last publication. 
(2) Alternative to service by publication. In circumstances de-
scribed in (1) above justifying service of summons by publication, if the 
party desiring service of summons shall file a verified petition stating the 
facts from which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely 
to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that 
service of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a copy of the 
summons and complaint to the party to be served at his address, or his 
last known address. Service shall be complete ten days after such mail-
ing. 
(3) Service outside of state. Personal service of a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint outside of this state is equivalent to service by publi-
cation and deposit in the post office, and shall be complete on the day of 
such service. 
(g) Manner of proof. Within five days after service of process, proof 
thereof shall be made as follows: 
(1) if served by a sheriff or United States marshal, or a deputy of ei-
ther, by his certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner 
of service. 
(2) if by any other person, by his affidavit thereof, with the same state-
ment. 
(3) if by publication by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or his 
foreman or principal clerk, showing the same and specifying the date of 
the first and last publication; and an affidavit by the clerk of the court of 
a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the post office as 
prescribed by Subdivision (0 of this rule, if such deposit shall have been 
made. 
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(4) by the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be 
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved. 
(h) Amendment . At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it 
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be 
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the 
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued. 
(i) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of 
the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall 
state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof. 
(j) Time of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the 
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left 
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and 
shall sign his name thereto, and, if an officer, add his official title. 
(k) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any pro-
ceeding where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court 
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate 
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall, be made 
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and 
shall be published in the English language. 
(1) Service of process by telegraph or telephone. A summons, writ, 
order or other process in any civil action or proceeding, and all other papers 
requiring service, may be transmitted by telegraph or telephone for service in 
any place within this state, and the telegraphic or telephonic copy of such 
process or paper so transmitted may be served or executed by the officer or 
other person to whom it is sent for that purpose, and returned by him, if 
return is required, in the same manner and with the same force and effect as 
the original thereof; and the officer or person serving or executing the same 
has the same authority, and is subject to the same liabilities as if the copy 
were the original. The process or paper, when a writ or order, must be filed in 
the court from which it was issued, and a certified copy thereof must be 
preserved in the telegraph or telephone office from which it was sent. The 
operator sending the message may use either the original or a certified copy of 
the process or paper. Whenever any document to be sent by telegraph or 
telephone bears a seal, either private or official, it is not necessary for the 
operator in sending the same to telegraph or telephone a description of the 
seal, or any word or device thereon, but the same may be expressed in the 
telegraphic or telephonic copy by the letters "L.S.," or by the word "Seal." 
(m) Service by constable. All writs and process, including executions 
upon judgments, issued out of a district, city or justice court in a civil action or 
proceeding may be served by any constable of the county. 
(Amended, effective March 1, 1988.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment added Subdivision (e)(12). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule generally 
follows Rule 4, F.R.C.P. 
Laws 1945, ch. 28, referred to in Subdivision 
(d)(1), appears as § 12-1-8, relating to actions 
by collection agencies. 
The reference, in Subdivision (e)(5), to the 
"president or clerk of the board of trustees" of 
an incorporated town seems incorrect. Accord-
ing to §§ 10-2-110 and 10-3-106, the governing 
body of an incorporated town consists of a 
council and mayor. 
Cross-References. — Collection agencies, 
process server in actions by, § 12-1-8. 
Condominium association or ownership, ser-
vice of process on person designated in declara-
tion, § 57-8-33. 
Constable, service of process by, §§ 17-22-25, 
17-25-1. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 60 
issue was deemed waived and could not be 
raised in a motion for new trial. Ute-Cal Land 
Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980). 
Cited in National Farmers Union Property 
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 
326 P.2d 722 (1958); Howard v. Howard, 11 
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley v. 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General Bldrs. 
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir 
Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29 
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v. 
State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); Edgar v. 
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com. 
Fin. Corp. v. Brimhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah 
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Mulherin v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gard-
ner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983); Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Golden 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah 
1985); York v. Unqualified Washington 
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah 
1986); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 
(Utah 1987); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur . 2d New Trial 
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., 
115, 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
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in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned to set aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 78-6-14; Appx. G, Code of Judicial Administra-
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion tion. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Default judgment. 
Jurisdiction. 
Other reasons. 
—"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Default judgment. 
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Incompetent counsel. 
Lack of due process. 
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Real party in interest. 
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—Effect of set-aside judgment. 
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—Fraud. 
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Motion distinguished. 
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—Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
Default judgment. 
Delayed motion for new trial. 
Failure to file cost bill. 
Failure to file notice of appeal. 
Failure to receive notice and findings. 
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Inconvenience. 
Merits of claim. 
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Trial court's discretion. 
Unemployment compensation appeal. 
Workmen's compensation appeal. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
Burden of proof. 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
I- r 
GARY FACIO, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
THE HON. MAURICE JONES, AND 
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AGENCY, INC., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 88-C-965G 
This matter came on for hearing on December 19, 1988, 
on cross motions by the plaintiff and defendant Jones for summary 
judgment, and on the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. Plaintiff Gary Facio was represented by Brian M. 
Barnard, defendant the Honorable Maurice Jones was represented by 
Carlie Christensen, and defendant Collection Management Agency 
was represented by Ralph C. Amott. Legal memoranda were 
submitted on behalf of all parties. Counsel argued the motions 
extensively, after which the matter was taken under advisement. 
The court now being fully advised, sets forth its Memorandum 
Decision and Order. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On March 17, 1988, plaintiff Gary Facio wrote and 
issued a check in the amount of $8.71 to a Salt Lake City eating 
establishment known as HIRES. Subsequently, the check was 
dishonored for insufficient funds by plaintiff's bank and 
returned to HIRES unpaid. On or about April 15, 1988, after 
receiving notice that the check was not paid, plaintiff mailed a 
money order in the amount of $10.00 to HIRES to cover the check 
and to help defray any additional costs. On April 29, 1988, 
defendant Collection Management Agency, Inc., commenced a civil 
action, on behalf of HIRES, against the plaintiff in the Third 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Sandy department, for collection 
of the dishonored check. Facio was properly served with a 
Summons and Complaint on May 6, 1988, but believing the matter 
had been handled with the money order, failed to file an Answer. 
On June 2, 1988, a default was taken in the Third Circuit Court, 
and on June 9, 1988 default judgment was entered against him in 
the amount of $190.46. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 
60(b), a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was filed on 
August 23, 1988, in the Third Circuit Court. On September 22, 
1988, a hearing was held in the Third Circuit Court on Facio1s 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. The Honorable Maurice 
Jones, in accordance with pronouncements of the Supreme Court of 
Utah, denied the Motion on the basis that Facio failed to offer 
proof of a meritorious defense. On September 28, 1988, a 
Satisfaction of Judgment was entered in Third Circuit Court by 
2 
Collection Management Agency. However, the Satisfaction of 
Judgment was facilitated by reason of garnishment against Facio's 
wages and on his bank account. 
Plaintiff Facio seeks declaratory relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983* for deprivation of property without due process of 
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff contends that Judge Jones' 
application of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c)2 and 60(b)3 is 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the,Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes 
of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to 
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of 
the District of Columbia. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the 
court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by 
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance 
with Rule 60(b). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). 
3
 (b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
3 
unconstitutional to the extent that a defendant is required to 
offer proof of a meritorious defense when seeking to set aside a 
default judgment. By pendent claim, plaintiff challenges the 
validity of the default and default judgment entered against him. 
Defendant Judge Jones contends that this court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims, that the claims are 
moot, that his application of Rules 55(c) and 60(b) in accordance 
with precedent established by the Supreme Court of Utah is 
constitutional, and that in any event he is immune from suit as a 
matter of law. The parties have filed cross motions for summary 
judgment. 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) 
when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and 
the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of 
a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
4 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Utah Supreme Court in effect has promulgated a 
court rule that under Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure a defendant must offer proof of a meritorious 
defense to an action before a default judgment can be set aside. 
State of Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667*P.2d 
1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983); Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322, 1323 
(Utah 1979); Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corp., 545 P. 2d 
507, 510 (Utah 1979). In its most recent pronouncement in 
Musselman, the court stated: 
In order for defendant to be relieved from 
the default judgment, he must not only show 
that the judgment was entered against him 
through excusable neglect (or any other 
reason specified in Rule 60(b)), but he must 
also show that his motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely, and that he has a 
meritorious defense to the action. 
Notwithstanding defendant's showing of 
timeliness and excusable neglect, unless he 
can show "some defense of at least ostensible 
merit as would justify a trial of the issue 
thus raised," his motion to set aside cannot 
justifiably be granted. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1055-56 (quoting Downey State Bank, 545 P.2d 
at 510) (footnotes omitted). The rationale for requiring the 
showing of a meritorious defense before a default judgment is set 
aside appears to be that in terms of judicial economy courts 
should not be occupied with cases that can be disposed of 
summarily where no meritorious defense to the claim exists. In 
5 
this case Judge Jones simply followed the precedents established 
by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Declaratory Judgment Action 
Defendants contend that this court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction because of lack of jurisdiction to review decisions 
of state courts. It is urged that in order to assess the 
constitutionality of his application of Rules 55(c) and 60(b) in 
this case, this court will be required to review Judge Jones' 
decision. 
It is clearly established law that the Supreme Court 
has the exclusive power to review state court decisions.4 
However, federal trial courts can adjudicate civil rights 
complaints such as that brought by plaintiff without directly 
reviewing state court decisions.5 The Tenth Circuit recognized 
4
 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Enq'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286, 296 (1970). 
5
 District courts have original jurisdiction of civil 
actions: 
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color 
of any State law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, 
privilege or immunity secured by the 
Constitution of the United States or by any 
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of 
citizens or of all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States. . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982). 
6 
this distinction in Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 
1429 (10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985). 
Razatos was an attorney who had been suspended from practice by 
the Colorado Supreme Court. He brought an action in federal 
district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory relief 
that the Colorado procedure for disciplining attorneys violated 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district 
court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.6 The Tenth Circuit reversed on the subject matter 
jurisdiction issue because of the distinction between challenging 
a particular state disciplinary proceeding and a general 
constitutional attack on state rules governing discipline. The 
court said that "district courts are . . . required to 
distinguish between general challenges to state bar rules as 
promulgated and challenges to state court decisions in particular 
cases." Id. at 1433. The court recognized that it would be 
inappropriate to review a particular state court proceeding and 
upheld the lower court on that aspect of its ruling, stating: 
M
 [T]o the extent Razatos sought review in the district court of 
6
 Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 549 F.Supp. 798 (D. 
Colo. 1982). Under the Colorado scheme, the Colorado Supreme 
Court makes the final factual determination as to whether an 
attorney should be disciplined. Razatos argued that Colorado 
Rule of Civil Procedure 252 as construed violated the due process 
clause because the final fact finders did not have an opportunity 
to hold a hearing and assess credibility prior to Razatos' 
suspension. 
7 
the judicial decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, the district 
court properly refused to hear his complaint." Ld. at 1432. 
The Tenth Circuit in Razatos concluded that Razatos1 
constitutional challenge was not "inextricably intertwined" with 
the state court decision so as to require review of the rule's 
application.7 The court said: "In order to evaluate this claim, 
the district court need not review the decision of the Colorado 
Supreme Court. It need only look at Rule 252 as promulgated, and 
as construed by state case law." Id. at 1434. The same is true 
in the case at hand. This court is simply being asked to render 
a ruling on a claim for declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
that as promulgated and construed by Utah case law, Rules 55(c) 
and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deprive the 
plaintiff of property without due process. In those 
circumstances, this court is not acting as an appellate court to 
7
 In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman. 460 
U.S. 462 (1983), the Supreme Court recognized the distinction 
between challenging a rule as promulgated and practiced, and 
challenging a particular state court decision. The Feldman court 
stated: 
If the constitutional claims presented to a 
United States District Court are inextricably 
intertwined with the state court's denial in 
a judicial proceeding . . . then the District 
Court is in essence being called upon to 
review the state-court decision• 
Id. at 483-484 n. 16. 
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review a decision of the Third Circuit Court of the State of 
Utah. 
Pendent Claim Jurisdiction 
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 
(1966), the Supreme Court stated that pendent claim jurisdiction 
exists "whenever there is a claim 'arising under [the] 
constitution1 . . . and the relationship between that claim and 
the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action 
before the court comprises but one constitutional case." Over 
time, the Supreme Court has developed a three-prong test for 
assessing whether a federal court should exercise jurisdiction 
over a pendent state claim. The test requires examination of the 
court's power to exercise jurisdiction, its discretion in 
exercising that power, and whether Congressional intent would 
preclude such exercise. 
As to the first prong, in United Mine Workers the court 
said that federal courts must have power to exercise pendent 
jurisdiction: 
The state and federal claims must derive from 
a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, 
considered without regard to their federal or 
state character, a plaintiff's claims are 
such that he would ordinarily be expected to 
try them all in one judicial proceeding, 
then, assuming substantiality of the federal 
issues there is power in federal courts to 
hear the whole. 
9 
Id. (footnote omitted). In this regard, a plaintiff's claim must 
not be "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior 
decisions . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to 
involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the 
District Court . . . " Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974) 
(quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 
666-67 (1974)). 
With respect to the second prong, "justification [for 
pendent jurisdiction] lies in considerations of judicial economy, 
convenience and fairness to litigants . . . " United Mine 
Workers, 383 U.S. at 726. The court thus recognized that pendent 
jurisdiction is a doctrine of judicial discretion and that a 
trial court has discretion to exercise its power when to do 
otherwise would result in duplicative proceedings. 
To satisfy the third prong, a trial court must examine 
the particular statute which confers jurisdiction over the 
federal claim in order to determine whether Congress intended to 
prevent pendent state claims. In this regard, the Supreme Court 
has said: 
[T]here must be an examination of the posture 
in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and 
of the specific statute that confers 
jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order 
to determine whether "Congress in [that 
statute] has . . . expressly or by 
implication negated" the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal 
claim. 
10 
Owen Equip. & Erection Co, v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978), 
(quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)). 
In the pendent claim in this case, plaintiff asks this 
court to set aside the default and default judgment. The three-
prong test for assessing the exercise of jurisdiction over that 
pendent state claim is satisfied. As to the power to exercise 
pendent jurisdiction, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) 
authorize federal courts to entertain suits brought to redress 
the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution, and it is 
clear that all of plaintiff's claims arose out of the same set of 
operative facts. Under the second prong it is manifest that 
refusal to exercise discretion in asserting pendent jurisdiction 
in this case would require duplicative proceedings which would 
not serve the ends of judicial economy, convenience and fairness 
to the litigants. Finally, under the third prong there is no 
reason to believe that Congress did not intend pendent state 
claims to be considered along with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.6 
Mootness 
Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims are barred 
by mootness because the judgment against the plaintiff was 
8
 Federal courts routinely take jurisdiction over pendent 
state claims when 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) confer 
jurisdiction over the federal claim. Anderson v. Reynolds. 34 2 
F.Supp. 101, 110 (D. Utah 1972) aff'd, 476 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 
1973) . 
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satisfied on September 28, 1988. Under the facts of this case, 
however, the judgment was involuntarily satisfied and the 
vitality of the plaintiff's grievance continues to exist* In 
Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 
(1963) , the Supreme Court addressed an analogous question. In 
that case, a labor dispute existed which provoked the Governor of 
Missouri effectively to seize a public transit business. 
Although the seizure was terminated after the appellant filed a 
jurisdictional statement with the United State Supreme Court, the 
court held that the claim was not moot. The court stated: 
lf[T]he labor dispute [giving rise to the seizure] remains 
unresolved. There thus exists in the present case not merely the 
speculative possibility of invocation of the [Act under which the 
governor seized the business] in some future labor dispute, but 
the presence of an existing unresolved dispute which continues. 
. . ." Id. at 77. 
In the case at bar, as in Motor Coach Employees, an 
unresolved dispute exists. Here, the dispute is whether 
requiring the showing of a meritorious defense in order to set a 
default judgment aside is constitutional. Acting under the 
precedent of applicable Utah Supreme Court decisions, state court 
judges will continue to refuse to set aside default judgments in 
the absence of the showing of a meritorious defense. Therefore, 
the issue presented by plaintiff in this case is not precluded by 
12 
the mootness doctrine. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said: 
The principles that determine . . . 
justiciability . • . are the well-established 
rules which permit a court to litigate an 
issue which, although technically moot as to 
a particular litigant at the time of appeal, 
is of wide concern, affects the public 
interest, is likely to recur in a similar 
manner, and, because of the brief time any 
one person is affected, would otherwise 
likely escape judicial review. . . . 
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981) (citation 
omitted). 
The matter before this court is of wide concern and 
affects the public interest in that citizens similarly situated 
are affected by the requirement that a meritorious defense must 
be shown to exist in order to set aside a default judgment. 
Furthermore, because a motion to set aside a default judgment is 
usually made within three months,9 a litigant otherwise would 
have a very short period of time in which to bring a complaint 
like the one at hand. Under the circumstances, this court holds 
that plaintiff's claims are not moot. 
Judicial Immunity 
It is a well established principle in our judicial 
system that judges are immune from liability for their acts 
committed in a judicial capacity. "[A] judge is entitled to 
9
 Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
13 
judicial immunity if he has not acted in clear absence of all 
jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial one." Martinez v. 
Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978))- See also Navajo Nation v. 
District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 130, 136 (D. Utah 
1985). The principle of judicial immunity does not apply, 
however, when the plaintiff simply seeks declaratory and 
prospective injunctive relief rather than monetary damages. That 
narrow exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity applies 
here. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).10 However, under 
the special circumstances of this case an award of attorneys fees 
against Judge Jones would be unjust. 
Constitutionality of the Utah Procedural Rules as Construed 
In Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 
896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988), the Heights Medical Center sued 
Peralta under his guarantee of a hospital debt incurred by one of 
his employees. Peralta did not answer or appear and a default 
judgment was entered against him. The judgment was recorded, a 
writ of attachment was issued, and unbeknownst to Peralta his 
real property was sold to satisfy the judgment. Thereafter, 
In Pulliam, the respondents sought to enjoin a state 
magistrate from requiring bond for a nonincarcerable offense. 
The court said: "We conclude that judicial immunity is not a bar 
to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer 
acting in her judicial capacity." Pulliam. 466 U.S. at 541-42. 
14 
Peralta began a bill of review proceeding to set aside the 
default judgment. Heights Medical Center filed a motion for 
summary judgment asserting that in order to have the default 
judgment set aside Peralta must show a meritorious defense to the 
action in which judgment had been entered. Peralta conceded that 
he did not have a meritorious defense. Heights Medical Center 
was granted summary judgment. On appeal to the Texas Court of 
Appeals, Peralta repeated his claim that requiring a meritorious 
defense violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but the court affirmed 
and held that whether or not there was proper service and notice, 
the showing of a meritorious defense was required in order to set 
aside a default judgment. On certiorari, the Supreme Court 
reversed and said: 
The Texas court held that the default 
judgment must stand absent a showing of a 
meritorious defense to the action in which 
judgment was entered without proper notice to 
appellant, a judgment that had substantial 
adverse consequences to appellant. By reason 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that holding is plainly infirm. 
Where a person has been deprived of property 
in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets 
of due process, "it is no answer to say that 
in this particular case due process of law 
would have led to the same result because he 
had no adequate defense upon the merits." 
Peralta, 99 L.Ed.2d at 82 (quoting Coe v. Armour Fertilizer 
Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424, 59 L.Ed. 1027, 35 S.Ct. 625 (1915)). 
15 
Defendants contend that Peralta is distinguishable 
because in that case deficiencies existed in the service of 
process and notice and that these defects constituted an 
underlying due process violation. However, if the Supreme Court 
had considered Peralta strictly to be a failed notice case, it 
could have decided the matter on the basis of Mullane v.*Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Mullane is 
the touchstone case for the fundamental due process requirement 
that reasonable notice must be given. It appears that the 
Supreme Court went beyond Mullane when it decided Peralta by 
effectively holding that a procedural rule which requires the 
showing of a meritorious defense is unconstitutional when that 
requirement is imposed in addition to procedural requirements 
which otherwise would justify setting aside a default judgment. 
This court interprets Peralta to stand for the proposition that 
it is a denial of due process of law to foreclose consideration 
of setting aside a default judgment because of a required showing 
of a meritorious defense. When a default judgment otherwise 
should be set aside because of improper notice or for any of the 
grounds set forth in rules 55(c) and 60(b), such as mistake or 
inadvertence, to impose the additional requirement of showing the 
existence of a meritorious defense is to deny a defendant due 
process. 
16 
In addition to the philosophy expressed by the Supreme 
Court in Peralta, there are other reasons to reject a procedural 
requirement that default judgments cannot be vacated in the 
absence of a showing of the existence of a meritorious defense. 
In this regard, requiring a defendant to make such a showing at 
the time he seeks to set aside a default judgment on otherwise 
permissible grounds denies that defendant the right to a 
substantive day in court. Setting aside a default judgment is a 
procedural matter, and to go straight to the substantive merits 
on a procedural motion is unfair. All litigants are entitled to 
a day in court, even if it is a short one. It is contended that 
a defendant will suffer no real harm or prejudice by reason of 
the requirement because the same judgment likely would be 
rendered a second time anyway. However, oftentimes the course of 
proceedings would be substantially altered if a default judgment 
were vacated even though the defendant never makes a showing of a 
meritorious defense. For instance, if the default judgment had 
been set aside in this case, plaintiff may have negotiated a 
settlement with the Collection Agency, or paid the debt before he 
suffered the embarrassment of having his wages garnished. 
Finally, it is manifest that judicial economy is not a valid 
basis or reason to justify the violation of constitutional 
rights. 
17 
Based upon the foregoing, the promulgated procedural 
rule of court which imposes the showing of a meritorious defense 
in addition to other requirements of Rules 55(c) and 60(b) 
U.R.C.P. before a default judgment can be vacated, is declared to 
be unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment is granted and the default judgment entered by 
the Third Circuit Court against plaintiff is set aside. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to lodge with the 
court a form of judgment consistent with this memorandum decision 
and order, after compliance with local rule 13(e). 
DATED: May . 1989. 
J. THOMAS GREENE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
COPIES TO: 5/30/89: 
Brian M. Barnard, Esq. 
Ralph C. Amott,Esq. 
Carlie Christensen, Esq. 
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